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Abstract 
The redistribution of fiscal resources from richer to poorer European Union (EU) member states has 
taken on a new quality in the wake of the Euro crisis. With the creation of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), fiscal redistribution in the EU has become a particularly contested aspect of 
European integration. We seek to uncover how ideological orientations shape citizens’ attitudes 
towards international redistribution. In a multi-level analysis of the European Elections Study 2014 we 
find that voter positions on a cultural ideology dimension are strongly linked to their preference on EU 
redistribution. At the same time we find that a link between voters’ location on an economic left-right 
scale and their preference for EU redistribution is conditional on whether they expect pecuniary gain 
from domestic redistribution. Among low-income citizens – those who tend to be the natural 
beneficiaries of domestic redistribution – a left-leaning position on the economic dimension does not 
translate into support for EU redistribution. It is only among the subgroup of high-income citizens that 
a left-leaning disposition translates into support for EU redistribution. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of the 2008 international financial crisis, European elites devised a 
financial transfer program to avoid the economic and financial meltdown of a number 
of European countries. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is funded 
by member states’ contributions, has been identified as the largest international 
transfer program in history since World War Two (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 
2014; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2016). The backlash against this transfer program 
was strong, with a majority of voters in most EU member states strongly opposing the 
idea of financially assisting other member states to help restore their public finances 
(Schmitt et al. 2015). 
The public divide over transfers eludes a simple explanation. Since the ESM 
was a response to events that revealed the vulnerability of modern capitalism, it might 
have reinforced economic left-right divisions among voters and political parties. Yet, 
recent studies suggest that it created a cross-cutting cultural division instead, pitching 
centrist pro-European parties and their voters against extremists on both sides of the 
left-right spectrum (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014).  
This article seeks to understand the determinants of voter preferences on 
international transfer programs using the case of the EU. We draw on three strands of 
literature to develop a set of theoretical explanations for the divide over transfers. The 
first strand focuses on individual differences in cultural openness and 
cosmopolitanism (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). The second account emphasizes the 
transfer program’s distributional consequences and predicts the strongest opposition 
to come from left-leaning, low-skilled workers and welfare dependents whose 
economic well-being might be negatively affected. The third approach stresses 
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differences in individual beliefs about distributive justice typically associated with the 
left-right divide (Picketty 1995, Fong 2001). 
We examine our hypotheses using data from the European Election Study 
(EES) 2014 which surveyed roughly 1000 individuals in each of the 28 EU member 
states (Schmitt et al. 2015). The EES includes a broad range of survey items on 
respondents’ economic situation as well as questions on the extent to which 
respondents find it desirable to financially assist EU member states facing severe 
economic and financial difficulties.   
A core finding in our study is that the conflict over EU transfers – aside from 
generating a cultural division - also reflects an economic left-right divide. This sheds 
new light on previous research, which found left-right orientations to be of little 
explanatory value. Our analysis reveals the association between left-right orientations 
and preferences over EU transfers, by taking into account well-established 
subcomponents of the left-right dimension, notably material self-interest and belief 
and value systems (Margalit 2013, Alesina and La Ferrera 2005). We show that the 
way in which the divide over EU transfers relates to the economic left-right 
orientations depends on whether material self-interest or beliefs about distributive 
justice are evoked. 
Among high-income individuals a left-leaning orientation is associated with a 
more favorable position towards EU transfers, even when accounting for cultural 
values like cosmopolitanism. Left-leaning high-income voters are able to transfer 
beliefs and values about fairness, equality, and distributive justice typically associated 
with the Left to a European level. A left-leaning orientation among low-income 
voters, by contrast, is associated with a strong opposition to EU transfers. These 
voters are likely to be cross-pressured, since their material self-interest could be 
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negatively affected by the transfer program’s potential downward pressure on 
domestic welfare programs. 1  Their material self-interest and belief systems are 
pointing in contradictory directions. 
We further examine a large variety of macro-economic contextual factors and 
find that support for EU redistribution is lowest among left-leaning, low-income 
individuals in poorer countries. We conclude by discussing the implications of our 
findings for the prospects of leftist political parties, who should find it increasingly 
difficult to position themselves on issues of international economic integration, 
including immigration, foreign aid and international financial rescues. 
 
EU redistribution 
The ESM is financed by the contributions of Eurozone members and provides 
financial assistance to struggling European economies, notably Portugal, Ireland, 
Cyprus and Greece. It gained more visibility and created a more sharply divided 
public than distributive programs in the EU budget, such as the European Structural 
and Investment Funds. A common currency zone might not be feasible without some 
sort of permanent redistributive program to alleviate economic inequalities, yet public 
support for transferring national resources to assist other countries is low (Schmitt et 
al. 2015).  
Existing efforts to understand the public divide over EU transfers (Bechtel, 
Hainmueller and Margalit 2014, Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014, Daniele and Geys 2015) 
have drawn on work that examines voter preferences on international economic 
integration, including trade policy, immigration, foreign aid and previous fiscal 
rescues. More recently studies on international economic integration have begun to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 One could of course contend that high income voters also fear higher taxation associated with EU 
transfers but previous literature finds very little evidence that rising taxes tend to be a major concern 
(Broz 2005; Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). 
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focus on non-economic cultural factors, whereas the traditional mainstream economic 
integration literature emphasizes the distributional impact of these policies on 
material well-being (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Broz 2005; Moravcsik 
1998).  
 
The Case for GAL-TAN 
Recent studies on international economic integration argue that individual 
preferences on international economic issues are best predicted by differences in 
cultural openness. They find that explanations centering on economic self-interest 
hold little explanatory value. Voters who are culturally open and cosmopolitan tend to 
show more support for immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, 2010), 
international trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) and European integration (Hooghe 
and Marks 2005, 2009, McLaren 2004, Risse 2010, Risse 2014, Kuhn and Stoeckel 
2014) than voters who are culturally closed and who harbor nationalist sentiments. 
Culturally open voters seem to hold a more encompassing definition of national 
community and borders, which allows them to perceive of international economic 
integration as less of a threat to their identity (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 
2004).  
Current studies about EU transfers are strongly influenced by these cultural 
explanations of preferences on economic integration. Based on two large-scale 
surveys conducted in Germany, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, for instance, find 
that more cosmopolitanism voters tend to view EU bailouts more favorably (Bechtel, 
Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). In a similar vein, Kuhn, Solaz, and van Elsas (2015) 
find that voters with a stronger European identity – as opposed to an exclusive 
national identity – are more supportive of EU solidarity.  
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These findings have important consequences for domestic political 
contestation. Given the importance of cultural as opposed to economic attitudes the 
divide over EU transfers would be unlikely to merge with the economic left-right 
dimension of political conflict, which structures citizens’ positions on issues like 
domestic income redistribution (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Marks and Steenbergen 
2002, Kitschelt 1994, 2004, Kriesi et al. 2006). Instead the divide would be more 
likely to reinforce a new non-economic cultural dimension of domestic political 
contestation (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, Hooghe and Marks 1999, Kriesi et al. 
2006, Kriesi et al. 2012, Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014, Risse 2010, 2014). 
The cultural or authoritarian–libertarian dimension (Kitschelt 1994) pitches green, 
alternative, and libertarian parties and voters against more traditional, authoritarian 
and nationalist ones (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Bechtel, Hainmueller and 
Margalit (2014: 836), for example, point out: “…support for these financial transfers 
exhibits a cross-cutting ideological pattern rather than a left-right divide, attitudes 
differ most significantly between supporters of centrist parties and extremist parties, 
whereby the latter are significantly less supportive of bailouts”. In line with this 
strand of literature, we therefore expect that voter preferences on EU redistribution 
are best predicted by individual differences in cultural openness and will be integrated 
into a cultural dimension of political contestation.  
The Case for Left-Right 
Economic Self-interest  
 The traditional literature on international political economy assumes that 
voters evaluate international economic policies based on how they will affect their 
economic well-being. It emphasizes economic self-interest and predicts that 
opposition to economic integration will be strongest among globalization losers and 
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weakest among globalization winners (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b, Broz 
2005). Although empirical evidence is mixed, low-skilled workers in capital-rich 
countries are usually assumed to be among the globalization losers because of an 
intensified labor-market competition that result from international trade and 
immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a). Following a similar logic, domestic 
welfare dependents are seen as potential losers given the potential downward pressure 
these policies exert on domestic redistributive programs (Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2010; Burgoon 2014; Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). 
 Empirical work examining preferences on immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 
2001a, Mayda 2006), free trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b) and international 
financial rescues (Broz 2005) does indeed find that low-skilled workers and welfare 
dependents form the strongest opposition to international economic integration. A real 
or perceived resource conflict between redistributive policies at home and 
international financial obligations seems to be a particularly strong driver of 
opposition to international economic policies (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). 
In addition to culturally closed voters it might therefore be the typically left-
leaning low-skilled labor and welfare dependents who become more defensive, 
protectionist and eager to preserve their domestic welfare system in the light of 
international economic integration (see Krisi et al. 2006). This could imply that the 
divide over economic integration will be subsumed within the traditional left-right 
dimension (Kriesi 2006 et al., Moravcsik 1998, Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). We 
expect voter preferences on EU transfers to be explained by self-interest and to map 
onto a left-right dimension of political contestation, with left-leaning low-income 
voters being more strongly opposed to EU transfers than right-leaning voters.  
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Beliefs in redistributive justice 
A shortcoming of most accounts on the relationship between international 
economic issues and domestic political contestation is that they tend to assume that 
left-right orientations are solely about material self-interest. Yet, left-right orientations 
are most likely a mixture of individual self-interest and political values regarding 
fairness, equality, distributive justice and the appropriate role of government, where 
values are understood as abstract beliefs about desirable end states. A vast literature 
on preferences over domestic redistribution – an important left-right issue – for 
example finds that support for redistributive programs is best explained by both self-
interest and individual belief and value systems (Margalit 2013, Alesina and La 
Ferrera 2005). Corneo and Grüner even argue that individuals primarily support the 
distributive program “which conforms with their vision of what constitutes a good 
policy for society as a whole” (Corneo and Grüner 2002: 1) rather than the program 
that maximizes private benefit. Aside from beliefs about fairness and equality, a 
stronger belief that economic hardships are due to external rather than individual 
factors, increases support for redistributive policies (Picketty 1995, Alesina and La 
Ferrera 2005, Petersen et al. 2011, Margalit 2013).  
Like material self-interest, leftist values and beliefs are likely to be associated 
with preferences on EU transfers, although not necessarily in the same way. A 
stronger belief in a fair and more equal society at home could for instance be 
associated with a more favorable position toward international redistribution, 
although the first is about redistributing between individuals and the latter is about 
redistributing between territories (Marks and Steenbergen 2002).  Recent work on 
bailout support in Germany does not directly examine values and beliefs about 
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distributive justice, but it shows that altruistic dispositions are related to greater 
support for EU redistribution (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014). 
Expanding the current discussion about EU transfers, which has focused on 
material self-interest and cultural values, we include values and beliefs about 
distributive justice as an additional explanatory variable. We predict that how the 
divide over EU transfers relates to the economic left-right dimension will ultimately 
depend on whether material self-interest or beliefs about distributive justice are 
evoked. The contrasting effect of these two underlying components of the left-right 
dimension is brought out when we examine individual differences in income or 
occupation. We expect a left-leaning orientation among high-income earners with a 
low risk of unemployment to be associated with a favorable position toward EU 
transfers, since their material well-being is unlikely to be compromised. Low-income, 
high-risk supporters of left parties are, by contrast, cross-pressured. Their leftist 
values and beliefs may clash with considerations of self-interest, seeing that their 
economic well-being could be adversely affected by a potential downward pressure 
on domestic resources for redistribution. Among this subgroup, we therefore do not 
expect left-leaning orientations to be associated with a higher degree of support for 
EU transfers. In fact, when motivated by a perceived resource conflict between 
domestic and EU redistribution left-leaning, low-income voters might be even more 
strongly opposed to EU transfers than right-leaning voters.  
 
< Figure 1: Preferences for EU transfers > 
 
We further hypothesize that the perceived resource conflict between domestic 
and EU redistribution intensifies as a country’s macro-economic situation worsens. 
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When economic performance is poor, voters might be even more inclined to perceive 
a trade-off between domestic and EU redistribution which is likely to result in overall 
lower levels of support for transfers in poorer countries. 2 Indeed, recent research 
suggests that support for EU-wide solidarity is higher in richer countries (Lengfeld et 
al. 2015; Kuhn, Solaz, and Elsas, 2015). We expect the support for EU transfers to be 
lowest among left-leaning low-income voters in poorer countries. By contrast, we 
expect support to be highest among left-leaning, high-income voters in richer 
countries.    
 
4 Data and Measurement 
Our empirical analysis draws upon the EES 2014. This survey offers data for all 28 
EU member states and includes about 1000 respondents per country. The field work 
took place shortly after the European elections in 2014. In order to operationalize our 
dependent variable, we rely on a survey item that asks respondents about their 
agreement with the transfer of fiscal resources between their own country and another 
EU member state.  
“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In 
times of crisis, it is desirable for [respondents’ country] to give financial help 
to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial 
difficulties?” [Response categories: 1: “totally disagree”, 2 “tend to disagree”, 
3 “tend to agree”, 4 “totally agree”] 
 
This question does not ask whether respondents generally support a transfer 
mechanism between member states or whether they expect a net-benefit from it. It !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Our survey item asks about the willingness to contribute to such a transfer program, not whether 
redistribution in general is desirable. It does not directly tap into expectations as to whether voters will 
benefit from such a program.  
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asks about the extent to which the respondent’s country of residence should contribute 
to such a mechanism, thereby making the costliness of transfers salient. 
We measure economic left-right orientations with a question about support for 
domestic redistribution.  This question asks whether respondents are fully opposed (0) 
to “the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor” in their country, fully in 
favor (10), or somewhere in between. An economically right-leaning position – that 
is, little support for domestic redistribution – implies low values on this measure. A 
left-leaning position is associated with high values on this economic ideology scale. 
This question captures a respondent’s economic left-right orientation more accurately 
than a left-right self-placement question, which is likely to evoke both economic and 
cultural considerations  
We use two measures to capture citizens’ location on the cultural dimension of 
political conflict. First, we include a dummy variable that equals one if individuals 
hold an exclusive national identity and zero when respondents identify with their own 
nation and with Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010, 2014, Kuhn and 
Stoeckel, 2014). Second, we construct a gal-tan ideology scale that includes attitudes 
towards a) immigration, b) same-sex marriages, and c) restraints on privacy rights. 
We combine these three items using a principal component analysis; low values 
represent a culturally open position and high values a culturally closed position. 3 
Our expectations regarding the association between left-right orientations and 
support for EU transfers require us to examine conditions in which respondents will 
perceive a resource conflict between domestic welfare programs and EU transfers. 
Unfortunately, the EES does not measure respondents’ income directly. We use a 
number of alternative measures. First, we use a self-reported measure of social class 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Left-right and gal-tan orientations constitute distinct dimensions (see online Appendix Table A9) 
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membership with three social classes following Iversen and Soskice (2006):  low-
income, middle-income, and high-income social class. Secondly, we test the 
robustness of our results by employing a measure on financial troubles: respondents 
are asked if they had trouble paying their bills in the last twelve months “most of the 
time”, “from time to time”, or “almost never/never”. Thirdly, we use occupational 
categories in the EES in order to group respondents according to the social class 
scheme developed by Oesch (2016). We reanalyze all results using these categories as 
dummy variables. 
We also control for citizens’ level of support for European integration. 
Citizens differentiate between the political and economic integration of EU member 
states (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). Individuals might support European integration, but 
oppose transfers between richer and poorer member states; or they might oppose a 
transfers between EU member states because they are Euroskeptics to begin with, 
which is a confounding factor we want to account for. Moreover, we control for 
education, age, and gender. 
Since our theoretical model predicts that a country’s economic performance 
shapes citizens’ views on EU redistribution, we include a number of economic 
performance indicators, namely a country’s logged GDP per capita, its budget deficit, 
and its accumulated debt.4 Additionally, we control for the share of social expenditure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The results also hold when we additionally control for net-contributions to the EU budget (as percent 
of a country’s GNI and using data from the 2013 EU budget). The notion behind this control variable is 
that citizens might oppose EU level redistribution because their country is already a large contributor to 
the EU budget (in which case we would expect that being a net-contributor is associated with less 
support for EU level redistribution). Alternatively, citizens in countries that receive transfers from the 
EU budget – i.e. individuals living in net-recipient countries – might oppose “their country” helping 
other member states in economic troubles because these citizens do not think of themselves as being in 
a position where they could or should help other EU member states (in this case we would expect being 
a net-recipient to be associated with less support for EU level redistribution). Inserting net-
contributions to the EU budget into our models, we find: (1) that all other results still hold and (2) that 
individuals in net-recipient countries are more opposed to EU level redistribution. However, whether 
an EU member state is a net-contributor or net-receiver has much to do with its GDP. Hence net-
contributions correlate highly with our GDP variable; in order to prevent multi-colinearity to affect the 
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as a percentage of GDP. On the one hand, citizens in countries with a larger welfare 
state could be more opposed to EU redistribution since they have more resources to 
lose. On the other hand, a larger welfare state that provides a significant safety net, 
might alleviate the conflict between resources used for domestic purposes and for 
international purposes. Hence, low-income citizens in countries with a larger welfare 
state might be less concerned about how a potential downward pressure on domestic 
resources affects their material well-being.  
We also include a dummy for countries that are Eurozone members. Although 
redistribution through the EU budget concerns all EU member states, recent and 
salient steps towards a more redistributive EU – like the ESM –concern only 
Eurozone member states. Thus, redistribution is more salient and costly for citizens of 
Eurozone member states. 
The EES 2014 data reveal a significant amount of variation in support of EU 
transfers within countries and across the EU-28.5 Support for EU transfers is highest 
in Sweden (3.1) and lowest in Cyprus (2.0), with a mean of 2.4. However, about 91 
percent of the variation in support of EU transfers is at the individual level.6 
< Figure 2: Mean support for EU transfers by country > 
 
We begin by examining descriptive statistics in order to understand how 
preferences for EU transfers are structured. Figure 3 reflects mean levels of support 
for EU transfers (1 = low support, 4 = high support) for three groups: voters who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
results we excluded net-contributions. Moreover, we believe that the mechanism relating net-
contributions and views on EU level redistributions is essentially the same as that which relates GDP 
and EU level redistributions: it is the fact that scarce recourses (at the macro level) decrease citizens’ 
willingness to help other EU member states.         
5 All analyses are conducted based on the EU-28. However, the results are similar in all substantive 
respects when we restrict the sample to Eurozone member states. 
6 The intra-class correlation coefficient is .087 
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prefer limited domestic distribution, voters who prefer moderate domestic 
redistribution, and those who prefer substantial domestic redistribution. Respondents 
expressing a preference for substantial domestic redistribution – our measure for a 
left-leaning orientation – exhibit slightly lower levels of support for EU transfers than 
respondents who prefer limited or moderate levels of domestic redistribution.  
If our theoretical expectations are accurate, we should only see a negative 
association between support for domestic redistribution and support for EU transfers 
among individuals who face a perceived or real “resource conflict”. Figure 4 therefore 
presents voters with a preference for substantial domestic redistribution by different 
levels of income. As theorized, individuals who support substantial domestic 
redistribution in the low-income social class are the ones most strongly opposed to 
EU transfers, while individuals supportive of substantial domestic redistribution in the 
high-income group have a much more favorable view of EU transfers. The expected 
pattern is also confirmed when looking at different occupational groups (Figure 4, 
bottom). Voters who prefer substantial domestic redistribution and who are either 
unskilled or unemployed express the lowest level of support for EU transfers. 
Managers and professionals who support substantial domestic redistribution express 
much higher levels of support for EU transfers. 
< Figure 3: Support for EU transfers by levels of support for domestic redistribution >  
 
< Figure 4: Support for EU transfers by class and occupation >  
 
 
5 Results 
The summary statistics presented in the previous section suggest that our 
expectations about individual preferences on EU transfers are supported by the data. 
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We now analyze the same data using a multilevel regression model (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002), which allows us to include both individual level and country level 
predictors while also accounting for the clustered structure of the data. We are 
primarily interested in two-way and three-way interactions, which can be understood 
more intuitively in the framework of a linear model. The results of an ordered logit, 
multilevel model and a hierarchical model with a linear link function are very similar 
and can be found in the appendix (Table A4). 
The results support our expectations regarding the association between 
cultural orientations and attitudes towards EU transfers. The two variables that 
capture citizens’ orientations on the cultural dimension of political conflict – the 
cultural ideology scale and (exclusive national) identity – have strong effects on 
support for EU transfers (Table 1, Models 1-3). Citizens who are culturally closed are 
more likely to oppose transfers in Europe, whereas culturally open individuals tend to 
be more supportive. Individuals who hold an exclusively national identity are less 
supportive of EU transfers than individuals who simultaneously hold a European 
identity. 
Coming back to our key question: do the results also suggest that economic 
left-right orientations are important in explaining the divide over transfers? Table 1 
presents the results of three multilevel regression models that help us answer this 
question. Model 1 shows that a left-leaning orientation alone, measured as support for 
domestic redistribution, has neither a statistically significant nor a substantively 
discernable effect on support for EU redistribution. This is in line with our 
expectations and previous research (Bensak et al. 2006: 25).  
Yet, as we predicted, the way in which economic left-right attitudes are related 
to support for EU transfers depends on whether respondents’ material self-interest or 
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their leftist beliefs and values are evoked. Model 2 includes an interaction between 
support for domestic redistribution and social class. The marginal effects plot (Figure 
5) shows that support for domestic redistribution is negatively related to support for 
EU transfers among individuals in a low-income class, whose material well-being 
might be negatively affected by EU transfers. In contrast, support for domestic 
redistribution is positively associated with support for EU transfers among individuals 
in a high-income social class. That is, left-leaning, high-income voters tend to view 
EU transfers more favorably than right-leaning, high-income voters, even when 
controlling for cultural orientations. We believe that these high-income voters, more 
so than low-income voters, are able to transfer their left-leaning values about a fair 
and more equal society to the European level, leading them to be more supportive for 
EU transfers. 
Figure 6 helps us interpret these findings; it shows predicted values of support 
for EU transfers for individuals in a low-income social class (straight line) and for 
individuals in a high-income social class (dashed line). Low-income social class 
respondents exhibit less support for EU transfers the more they support domestic 
redistribution. In contrast, support for domestic redistribution is associated with 
higher support for EU transfers among the high-income group.7  
 
< Figure 5: Marginal effect of support for domestic redistribution  
on EU transfers by social class >  
 
< Figure 6: Support for EU transfers by social class >  
 
< Figure 7: Support for EU transfers by social class and GDP p.c. >  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The results also hold when we use dummy variables for social class (and respective interaction terms) 
instead of the continuous measure with three levels displayed here.  
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Our alternative measures – an indicator for the financial troubles of the 
respondent and the occupational status categories proposed by Oesch (2016) – support 
these conclusions (see Tables A3, A6, and A7). Among respondents having incurred 
financial trouble within the last 12 months, a left-leaning orientation – measured as 
support for domestic redistribution - is associated with lower support for EU transfers. 
This is not the case among respondents who have not faced such financial trouble. 
Similarly, among the unemployed and the low-skilled, a left-leaning orientation 
produces lower support for EU transfers, whereas it is associated with higher support 
for EU transfers among highly-skilled labor, professionals, and managers 
 These results lend support to our theory: left-leaning, high-income citizens 
are significantly more supportive of EU transfers than right-leaning, high-income 
citizens. They combine a strong support for domestic redistribution with a strong 
support for international redistribution. Left-leaning, low-income individuals, by 
contrast, are strongly opposed to EU transfers. We believe them to be cross-pressured. 
Their leftist belief and value system might lead them to support EU transfers, but they 
also perceive their material well-being to be adversely affected by an EU transfer 
scheme that could take resources away from domestic programs.  
< Table 1. Multilevel regression model results > 
 
< Figure 2. Marginal effect of ‘support for domestic redistribution’ on EU transfers by 
social class > 
 
 
< Figure 3. Predicted support for EU transfers for individuals in a low social class and 
in a high social class > 
 
Does a country’s macro economic situation matter for the extent to which its 
citizens support transfers in the EU? Model 1 and Model 2 include levels of (logged) 
GDP per capita, deficit, debt, and social spending as a percentage of GDP. Only the 
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coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and significant, suggesting that individuals 
in richer countries exhibit more support for EU transfers and individuals in poorer 
countries exhibit less support for EU transfers. In short, citizens in poorer countries 
are less inclined to contribute to a European transfer scheme. 
Our results also show that a country’s macro-economic condition has an 
impact on the way in which support for domestic redistribution relates to support for 
EU transfers. To analyze this relationship, we include a three-way interaction in 
Model 3 (support for domestic redistribution*social class*GDP per capita). Following 
Dawson and Richter (2006), we evaluate the average marginal effect of support for 
domestic redistribution on support for EU transfers for four distinct groups while 
holding all other variables constant: citizens in a low-income class in poor countries 
(1), citizens in a high-income class in poor countries (2), citizens in a low-income 
class in rich countries (3), and citizens in a high-income class in rich countries (4). 
We define a poor country as one with a GDP per capita that is one standard deviation 
below the EU-28 mean (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, and Latvia) and we define a rich 
country as one with a GDP per capita that is one standard deviation above the EU-28 
mean (e.g. Luxembourg and Sweden).  
Figure 4 shows predicted levels of support for EU transfers for each of the 
four groups. Support for EU transfers in poorer countries (1, 2) is lower than in richer 
countries (3, 4). Individuals who support domestic redistribution in a poor country 
exhibit the lowest level of support for EU transfers. In contrast, individuals who 
support domestic redistribution in a high-income social class in a rich country are 
expressing the highest levels of support for EU transfers. 
We further evaluate whether the average marginal effect of support for 
redistribution on support for EU redistribution is different for the four groups 
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described above (Dawson and Richter 2006). Table A2 in the appendix reveals that 
five of the slopes of the six lines are statistically different from one another (p < .05 or 
less) with the only exception being the slopes for individuals in a high social class in a 
poor country and for individuals in a low social class in a rich country. These results 
support our predictions on the role of a country’s economic situation. 
 
< Figure 4. Predicted support for EU transfers 
for four groups of citizens > 
 
 
Among the control variables, we find that individuals with more education and 
those who support European integration are more likely to support EU transfers, while 
women are less likely to support EU transfers. Individuals in Eurozone countries 
show less support for EU transfers than individuals who live in EU member states 
outside of the Eurozone.  
 
6 Conclusion 
  Most experts consider that a transfer program offering financial assistance to 
Eurozone countries facing adverse economic shocks is necessary to restore the 
stability of the region (Krugmann 2011). Yet, instruments like the European Stability 
Mechanism have provoked fierce public debate. Many voters strongly oppose a 
transfer of resources to assist other countries and in a number of European countries 
public dissatisfaction gave rise to new challenger parties. A long-term policy solution 
will need to be based on a better understanding of what explains voter preferences on 
redistributive transfers in Europe.  
 Current research understands the divide over EU transfers primarily as a 
cultural conflict that pitches culturally closed political parties and their voters against 
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culturally open parties and voters (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014; Kuhn and 
Stoeckel 2014; Kuhn, Solaz, v. Elsas 2015). While our analysis of the 2014 European 
Election Study (EES) confirms the importance of cultural orientation, we find that 
economic left-right orientations are fundamental to a fuller understanding of voters’ 
preferences on international redistribution.  
 Our analysis shows that among high-income voters, an economically left-
leaning orientation is associated with significantly higher levels of support for EU 
transfers than a right-leaning orientation, even when controlling for cultural openness 
and European identity. Among voters in a low-income class, by contrast, a left-
leaning orientation is associated with a strong opposition to EU transfers. 
What explains these diverging responses? We argue that a left-right orientation 
has multiple components and that the association of each with support for EU 
transfers differs. Voters might be motivated by self-interest and take a left-leaning 
position because they depend on domestic redistributive policies for income support, 
or they might be left-leaning because it resonates with their idea of distributive 
justice. Among low-income, left-leaning citizens these two considerations clash when 
it comes to support for EU transfers. Seeing that they might be among the losers of a 
mechanism that redistributes a country’s fiscal resources to other EU member states 
and potentially exerts a downward pressure on domestic redistribution (Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2010; Burgoon 2014), their material self-interest leads them to take a less 
favorable position towards EU redistribution than their otherwise leftist values about 
equality and fairness would predict. Left-leaning individuals in high-income classes, 
on the other hand, do not have the same conflicting pressures and can more easily 
apply their leftist value and belief system to the international level.  
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Our analysis further shows that citizen in poorer EU member states are less 
willing to contribute to a European redistributive mechanism than citizens in richer 
member states. In fact, low-income citizens in poor EU member states who are very 
supportive of domestic redistribution exhibit the strongest opposition to EU transfers. 
This leads us to believe that poor macro-economic conditions can aggravate a 
perceived “resource conflict” between domestic redistribution and international 
redistribution.  
Our findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that find non-
economic cultural considerations to be important factors in explaining voter 
preferences on international economic issues like immigration, trade, financial rescues 
and European economic integration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007, 2010; 
Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010, 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Bechtel, 
Hainmueller and Margalit 2014). These studies suggest that the complexity of 
international economic policies makes cultural frames more appealing while the 
distributional consequences are less easily evaluated. Our findings, however, show 
that cultural accounts are incomplete and that individuals’ economic left-right 
orientations are necessary for a fuller understanding of mass attitudes on international 
economic issues. High-income, left-leaning individuals in EU member states are 
consistently more supportive of international fiscal transfers than right-leaning 
individuals, irrespective of their cultural orientation. Arguably, low-income, left-
leaning citizens are equally as opposed or more opposed than right-leaning citizens to 
EU transfers. This preference pattern is likely to apply to other economic issues, for 
instance the extension of welfare benefits to immigrants or trade relations with the 
developing countries.  
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It is clear that the multidimensionality of left-right orientations makes it 
problematic for leftist political parties to position themselves on the issue of 
international redistribution. Arguing in favor of assisting economically struggling EU 
members may earn leftist parties the endorsement of left-leaning, high-income voters, 
but it could cost them their traditional working-class clientele. Our analysis provides a 
useful framework for understanding the electoral struggles of leftist parties in an era 
of economic integration and their failure to delay a shrinking of their traditional socio-
economic support basis. With working-class voters being among the real or perceived 
losers in a globalized society, leftist parties’ stance on pro-economic integration is 
increasingly likely to be viewed as a betrayal. 
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Figure 1: Theory on preferences for EU transfers
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Figure 2: Mean support for EU transfers by country
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Figure 3: Support for EU transfers by levels of support for domestic redistribution
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Figure 4: Support for EU transfers by class and occupation (only respondents with high support
for domestic redistribution, i.e. left leaning voters)
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Figure 5: Marginal e↵ect of support for domestic redistribution on EU transfers by social class
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Figure 7: Support for EU transfers by social class and GDP p.c. (three-way interaction)
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Online Appendix A
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
variable count mean sd min max
support for EU transfers 28796 2.45 0.95 1.00 4.00
social class 29220 1.01 0.69 0.00 2.00
support for domestic redistr. 28483 6.23 2.93 0.00 10.00
exclusive national identity 29624 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
cultural ideology 26226 -0.00 1.08 -2.83 2.52
education 29511 1.22 0.73 0.00 2.00
sex 30064 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
age 30064 51.06 17.92 16.00 99.00
EU support 27362 4.66 3.11 0.00 10.00
GDP p.c. (logged) 30064 10.09 0.33 9.38 11.16
ppp 30064 25452.66 9197.29 11900.00 70100.00
Deficit 30064 -3.52 3.44 -14.90 0.90
Debt 30064 72.41 36.73 10.10 175.00
Social GDP 30064 17.29 4.13 11.30 25.10
net contributions 2013 as percent of GNI 30064 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.06
Table A2: Analysis of three-way interaction e↵ects following Dawson and Richter (2006)
slope standard
di↵erence error
Low class in poor country vs
Low class in rich country
-0.018* 0.007
High class in rich country vs
Low class in rich country
0.034*** 0.008
High class in poor country vs
Low class in rich country
0.004 0.008
High class in rich country vs
Low class in poor country
0.051*** 0.006
High class in poor country vs
Low class in poor country
0.022** 0.008
High class in poor country vs
Low class in poor country
-0.029*** 0.007
rich country: GDP p.c. 1sd above mean, poor country: GDP p.c. 1sd below mean,
low social class: class = 0, high social class: class=2
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A5: Oesch (2016) based coding of occupations in EES 2014 data set
Oesch category European Election Study occupational category
Category 0, Lowest status class 3) Unemployed; Excluded: 1) Houseperson; Respon-
sible for shopping, etc. 2) Student 4) Retired, ex-
plains loss of N=10000] *previous occupation: too
much missing data, unreliable estimates.
Category 1, Low-skilled working class 18) Unskilled (low-skilled production workers)
Category 2, Skilled working class craft workers, clerks and skilled service workers, 13)
Employed position working at desk, 15) Employed
position not working at desk but in service 16) Su-
pervisor or skilled craft worker 17) Skilled manual
worker 14) Employed position, not at a desk but
travelling
Category 3, Small business owners 5) Farmer 6) Fisherman 8) Owner of a small shop
Category 4, Lower middle class 12) Middle management (semi-professionals and as-
sociate managers)
Category 5, Upper and upper-middle
class professionals, managers)
9) Business proprietor 7) Professional 10) Employed
Professional 11) General Management (large employ-
ers, self-employed and employed)
Numbers refer to occupational codes of the EES 2014 data set
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Table A7: multilevel regression analysis that uses Oesch based occupation coding to opera-
tionalize income, Model 3, DV: support for EU transfers
Model 3
support for domestic redistrib.  0.325 (0.218)
unskilled  2.839 (2.827)
skilled  1.821 (1.746)
famrers, fishermen 3.822 (2.736)
semi-professional 0.037 (2.177)
professional, management 0.078 (1.986)
unskilled ⇥ support for domestic redistrib.  0.105 (0.397)
skilled ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. 0.047 (0.246)
famrers, fishermen ⇥ support for domestic redistrib.  1.183⇤⇤ (0.416)
semi-professional ⇥ support for domestic redistrib.  0.327 (0.327)
professional, management ⇥ support for domestic redistrib.  0.310 (0.301)
GDP p.c. 0.234 (0.200)
support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.031 (0.022)
unskilled ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.289 (0.281)
skilled ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.176 (0.174)
famrers, fishermen ⇥ GDP p.c.  0.388 (0.273)
semi-professional ⇥ GDP p.c.  0.004 (0.216)
professional, management ⇥ GDP p.c.  0.009 (0.198)
unskilled ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.009 (0.039)
skilled ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c.  0.004 (0.025)
famrers, fishermen ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.119⇤⇤ (0.042)
semi-professional ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.034 (0.032)
professional, management ⇥ support for domestic redistrib. ⇥ GDP p.c. 0.033 (0.030)
exclusive national identity  0.306⇤⇤⇤ (0.017)
cultural openness  0.108⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)
education 0.075⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)
sex  0.041⇤⇤ (0.015)
age 0.002⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)
support for European integration 0.068⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)
Eurozone member  0.259⇤⇤⇤ (0.078)
deficit  0.009 (0.012)
debt  0.000 (0.001)
socialgdp  0.006 (0.010)
Constant  0.005 (1.946)
Observations 13419
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A9: Correlation between support for domestic redistribution (left-right ideology) and
gal-tan ideology
country correlation
Austria  0.0757⇤
Belgium  0.0394
Bulgaria 0.0916⇤
Croatia 0.031
Cyprus 0.0717
Czech Republic 0.222
Denmark  0.0947⇤⇤
Estonia 0.0318
Finland  0.0244
France  0.1931⇤⇤⇤
Germany 0.0023
Greece 0.0111
Hungary 0.1115⇤⇤⇤
Ireland 0.0411
Italy  0.0314
Latvia 0.0909⇤⇤
Lithuania 0.0072
Luxembourg  0.0652
Malta 0.0609
Netherlands  0.1596⇤⇤⇤
Poland 0.1139⇤⇤
Portugal 0.0305
Romania 0.0316
Slovakia 0.0746⇤
Slovenia 0.0641⇤
Spain  0.0916⇤⇤
Sweden  0.1237⇤⇤⇤
United Kingdom  0.1248⇤⇤⇤
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Online Appendix B: Variable Coding 
Dependent variable (from EES 2014): 
Support for EU transfers: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement? In times of crisis, it is desirable for Germany to give financial help to another 
EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties. Four response 
categories, coded in the following way: 1= totally disagree, 2= tend to disagree, 3= tend 
to agree, 4= totally agree   
Independent variables (from EES 2014): 
Social class: Could you please tell me where you would place yourself on the following 
scale? Where '1' corresponds to "the lowest level in society" and '10' corresponds to "the 
highest level in society. Responses are coded in the following way, as offered by D61r of 
the dataset: 1-4= low social class, 5-6= middle class, 7-10 upper social class. 
Support for domestic redistribution: We would like to ask you to position yourself on a 
scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the top" 
and '10' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the bottom". Then if your 
views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your 
position best: [0] You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to 
the poor in (OUR COUNTRY), [10] You are fully opposed to the redistribution of 
wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY). Recoded: 0= low support for 
domestic redistribution; 10= high support for domestic redistribution 
 
Exclusive national identity: For each of the following statements, please tell me to what 
extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: You feel you are a citizen of the 
EU. Yes, definitely = 1, Yes, to some extent = 2, No, not really = 3, No, not at all = 4. 
Recoded: exclusive national identity = 1 (no European identity present: No, not really = 
3 & No, not at all = 4), exclusive national identity = 0 (European identity present: Yes, 
definitely = 1, Yes, to some extent = 2) 
 
Cultural ideology: We combine three variables using their common factor: a question on 
same-sex marriages, a question on civil liberties, and a question on attitudes towards 
immigrants. The range of the common factor is -2.8 (culturally closed position) to 2.5 
(culturally open position). Question wording: We would like to ask you to position 
yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means that you "fully agree with the statement 
at the top" and '10' means that you "fully agree with the statement at the bottom". Then 
if your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your 
position best. 1) same-sex marriage: [0] You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage, [10] 
You are fully opposed to same-sex marriage; 2) civil liberties: [0] You fully support 
privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime, [10] You are fully in favour of 
restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime; 3) immigration: [0] You are fully in 
favour of a restrictive policy on immigration, [10] You are fully opposed to a restrictive 
policy on immigration. 
 
Education: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? Replies coded in 
the following way: education low (0) = education until the age of 15 or less; education 
medium (1) = education until the ages 16-19; education high = education until the age of 
20 or more & still studying 
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EU support: Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it 
already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale 
from 0 to 10, where '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it 
"should be pushed further". What number on this scale best describes your position? [0] 
European unification has already gone too far, [10] European unification should be 
pushed further 
 
Financial troubles: During the last 12 months, would you say you had difficulties to pay 
your bills? Replies recoded into a dummy variable: 0=almost never/never, 1=from time 
to time & most of the time.  
Occupation: What is your current occupation? Replies recoded according to Oesch 
(2016) scheme displayed in Table A5. 
 
Age: How old are you 
 
Sex: 0= male, 1=female 
 
Independent variables from other sources: 
Eurozone dummy: 0 for all EU member states that are not part of the Eurozone and 1 
for all EU member states that are part of the Eurozone  
 
Debt: General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat 
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
Deficit: Net lending (+) /net borrowing (-) of the general government as a percentage of 
GDP (Eurostat 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
Social GDP: General government expenditure on social protection as a percentage of 
GDP (Eurostat 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant in Purchasing Power Parity, (Eurostat 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
 
EU net budget contributions: net contributions to the EU budget of each EU member 
state as a percentage of this country’s Gross National Income (Source: EU Budget 2014 
Financial Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2015, p.145.  
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